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ABSTRACT
The recent literature on the economic behavior of unions is dominated by
a controversy over whether or not bargaining is Pareto optimal. If unions
care about employment as well as wages, efficient bargains between unions and
management "should" involve both these variables rather than only wages. In
fact, explicit bargaining over employment levels is virtually unknown. There
is, however, implicit bargaining over employment in the form of rules
concerning the labor/capital ratio, job assignment, work speeds, and the like.
This paper examines a model of "semi-efficient" bargaining in which the union
and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules. The results
are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient
bargaining (i.e, over wages and the level of employment) and bargaining
solely over wages. Of particular interest is the case in which the union and
the firm mutually consent to "featherbedding" agreements (requiring the hirinr.
of workers with zero marginal product). The major conclusion of the paper is
that the outcome of collective bargaining is different in the case of
negotiations over work rules and wages than in both the cases of fully
efficient bargaining and of bargaining solely over wages. In general,
however, the outcome of this "partially efficient" bargaining process is
closer to the outcome of bargaining solely over wages than to that associ:tcd
with fully efficient bargaining over both wages and employment.
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(313) 763-43901. The Issues
Inthe burgeoning literature on the behavior of trade unions there is
considerable controversy about, among other things, what unions and management
bargain about. The conventional approach is to specify that the union and the
firm first negotiate a contract specifying the wage level and structure that
will be in effect for a specified period of time. The firm is then free to
set the values of employment and the other inputs so as to maximize profit.
To the extent that the union cares about employment as well as wages, the
union's bargaining position will depend in part on its perception of the
elasticity of labor demnand. An alternative approach is based on the
recognition that a bargaining outcome that lies on the labor demand curve will
not be Pareto optimal. If the union receives utility from both employment and
wages in excess of opportunity cost, certain combinations of a reduction in
the wage and an increase in employment off the demand curve can make both the
firm and the union better of f. The contract curve between the wage and the
employment level that is derived from efficient bargaining is less negatively
sloped than the demandcurveand may, indeed, be vertical or upward-sloping.
Which of these approaches, the demand curve model or the contract curve
model, is more accurate has important macroeconomic implications (see Hall and
Lilien and MacDonald and Solow). The two models also have different
implications concerning the efficiency losses associated with unionism. With
bargaining over both wages and employment the effect of higher union wages is
essentially a reduction in monopoly profit; if the equilibrium is on the
demand curve (as in Johnson and Mieszkowski), union gains cause-a small
decline in GNP but are primarily at the expense of nonunion workers. The
relative validity of the two hypotheses is also crucial to an understanding of
what unions are all about, a question of interest primarily to labor
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economists (but not without public policy implications). Accordingly, there
have been some attempts to test the implications of the two approaches
(Ashenfelter and Brown, Carruth and Oswald, and MaCurdy and Pencavel) for
specific unions.
For the contract curve model to be superior to the demand curve model,
it must be true that management and unions generally bargain --either directly
or indirectly ——overemployment. In fact, the level of employment is almost
never the subject of explicit negotiation in collective bargaining (see Oswald
(1984)). The usual reason given for this (see Farber (1985) and Ashenfelter
and Brown) is that an agreement on employment must be made conditional on
something, and the employer, who usually has better information about current
product demand and the like, has a strong incentive to cheat. If the union
suspects cheating, it will obviously be reluctant in future negotiations to
trade of f wages for empty promises of employment above profit-maximizing
levels, and it will choose to bargain only over wages --thedemand curve
model.
On the other hand, indirect bargaining over employment is fairly common
in the U.S. and other developed countries.3 First, the minimum number of
workers assigned to each machine or operation is sometimes the subject of
labor-management negotiations. Employment is then equal to the negotiated
labor/capital ratio times the amount of capital the firm chooses to use.In
the extreme, an agreement could specify that the firm must hire more workers
per machine than can conceivably be productive, which is described as
"featherbedding" ("overmanning" in the U.K.). Second, unions and management
often bargain over work intensity —-thepace of work, the number of different
functions each worker can be ordered to perform, the number and length of
coffee breaks, and so forth. For a given demand for "efficiency units" of3
labor, the level of employment will be inversely related to how intensely the
firm is allowed to make its employees work. Compliance with agreements over
the capital/labor ratio and the pace of work are also, unlike the total volume
of employment contingent on the state of prodtict demand, fairly easily
monitored.
This paper is concerned with the implications of Pareto—efficient
bargaining over certain variables that determine employment indirectly as well
as wages. Is there a presumption that the negotiated capital/labor ratio will
be higher than it would be if the firm could set its value unilaterally? Will
work intensity be higher or lower under unionism? To what extent does the
outcome with bargaining over the labor/capital ratio and/or work intensity
resemble the outcome of an efficient bargain over employment and wages? Under
what circumstances does efficient bargaining yield an outcome of
featherbedding? These are rather obvious questions to a labor economist, but
they have not been addressed in the literature in a straightforward manner.
(An unstraightforward approach to some of these issues is Tauman and Weiss.)
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the
distinction between the demand curve and contract curve models; Section 3
examines the case of efficient bargaining over the capital/labor ratio;
Section 4 looks at featherbedding; Section 5 investigates the determination
of work intensity with and without efficient bargaining; and Section 6
contrasts profit sharing agreements with models of fully efficient bargaining
over employment. Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. Demand Curve and Contract Curve Models
Although the distinction between the demand curve (DC) and contract
curve (CC) models of bargaining outcomes is fairly well—known, it is useful4
to set out their basic results for purposes of comparison with the work
restrictions models presented subsequently.
First, a monpolistic firm hires N homogeneous workers (who work an
exogenously fixed number of hours over the unit of time) and rents K units of
capital to produce output level Q. The production function exhibits constant
returns in N and K, and it is assumed initially that its elasticity of
capital—labor substitution is positive and finite. The profit equation for
the firm is
(1) r =V(Kf(N/K))—WN—rK,
where V is revenue as a function of output, W the wage rate the firm has
negotiated with the union, and r the rental price of machinery. By the DC
model, the firm and the union first determine W in collective bargaining
negotations, and then the firm chooses N and K to maximize profit given the
negotiated value of W. This implies that air/aN =V'f'—Wand 3ir/3K =
zf']-rare both set equal to zero. The labor/capital ratio (z) is
determined from the single equation in which the ratio of the marginal
products of labor and capital equal the ratio of their prices, f'/(f -zf')=
W/r,and —a(log z)/a(log W) =a,the elasticity of labor/capital substitution.
The effect of a change in W on the level of capital input is then found by
taking the logarithmic total derivative of either of the first order
conditions and solving for d(log K) to obtain
a(log K) - (2)
a(log W)
—a(o-e),
where a =f'z/fis the employment elasticity of output and e =-1/(V'Q/V')is
the inverse of the absolute elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to5





This is, of course, analogous to the Hicks wage elasticity of demand ina
competitive industry.
There is much less agreement on what the union strives toaccomplish
through collective bargaining. It has become quite common to assume that the
utility of "the union" is a general function of the negotiatedwage,
employment, and the alternative wage available to union members. For the
purposes of this paper it is convenient to assume that the union utility
function takes the form
(4) R =(W—W)N,t3 >0.
W -Wis the rent of the individual union worker -—thedifference between a
the union wage and that of a relevant comparisongroup of (presumably
nonunion) workers. One special case of (4) is that of j3 =1,collective rent
maximization, which is the most common assumption in the literature. More
generally, the union cares relatively more about wages or employment as (3l.
A second important special case is that in which the union cares only about
wages, j3=. This would arise if, for example, there were a strict seniority
system governing layoffs and the median union member neither perceives any
danger of losing his job nor cares about the welfare of less senior workers.
(3=isalso implicit in the "institutionalist" bargaining models of
Ashenfelter and Johnson and Farber (1977) in which the union leadershipcan6
only agree to a wage level at least as large as that anticipated by rank-and-
file union members.
Holding R constant, the reduction in wages that the union would accept
for a unit increase in employment is determined from
(5) ()= - 1(a)
which is negative for W >
Waand< . Ifthe union had complete power in
the context of a DC bargaining process, it would set W so as to maximize R
subject to the firm's labor demand function. It would, in this circumstance,
continue to raise W so long as >i1(W_Wa)/W
unless profit becomes zero and
the firm is in danger of shutting down.
The problem with the DC model is that at any initial negotiated wage
both the union and the firm could be made better off by an appropriate




In Pareto—efficient bargaining, the firm and the union will trade off wages
and employment such that the slopes of the iso—profit and iso-rent curves are
equal. Equating (6) with (5), the marginal revenue product of labor in the
contract curve (CC) model is set equal to a weighted average of the negotiated
and alternative wage rates:
(7) v'f' =w(i—) + W7
This, along with the marginal condition for capital, V'(f-zf')=r, allows one
to derive the slope of the contract curve. First, the proportionate effect of
W on the labor capital ratio is
88(log z) —— W(j3-l)
8(log W) W(a_l)+Wa'
which is0 as a1.The next step is to derive 8(log K)/a(log W) by
substituting (8) into the total logarithmic derivative of the marginal





whereiisthe absolute elasticity of demand in the DC model (see (3)) and
I1=(W_Wa)/Wa is the negotiated effect of the union on the relative wage rate.
If 3 >1,which means that the union cares relatively more about wages than
employment, the contract curve has a negative slope. It is less negative than
in the DC modelunlessa=(the union cares only about wages), in which case
the CC model degenerates to the DC model. When the union cares more about
employment than wages (< 1),the contract curve has a positive slope.
It is useful for subsequent purposes to calculate labor's share of
total cost, s=Wz/(Wz+r). To do this, note that the condition for profit
maximization with respect to K can be rewritten as V'f =V'f'z+r=W(l-l/a)+
W/a+r.V'f'z equals (7) multiplied by z, so a =f'z/f=Wz/(Wz+r),where
W is the weighted average of W and W given by (7). The resultant labor cost
share in the CC model is then easily found to be
—__________ (10)S—8
and the labor/capital ratio is
(11)
_a r (3 —
1—aW p
Itis straightforward to show that s>a and z>(a/(l—a))r/W, their prof it—
maximizing values, if L3< and j2>O.
3. Efficient Bargaining Over the Labor/Capital Ratio
For the reasons discussed in Section 1, bargaining over W and N may not
be feasible, but in many instances unions bargain over the nature of the
production function. One fairly common practice is for the union and the firm
to bargain over the number of workers who must be assigned to each machine.
Such an agreement is fairly easily monitored, for the contract specifies that
if a particular machine is used over a certain period it must have X workers
"manning" it.' In contrast to the DC and CC models of the preceding section,
the union and the management first jointly determine W and z, and then the
firm sets K (and hence N =zK)so as to maximize profit. This model (LC, for
labor/capital) is identical in form to the CC model except that z rather than
N is determined in the bargaining process.' The interesting questions
concern how the outcome —-interms of the value of z and the relation between
N and W --comparewith the DC and CC models.
To derive the contract curve for this model, it is first necessary to
see how the negotiated values of W andz influence the firm's demand for
capital, for this will be taken account of in the bargaining process. The
profit function, (1), may be rewritten as ir=V(Kf(z)) —[Wz+r]K,and the9
condition for maximum profit, conditional on the negotiated values of W andz,
is
(12) =V'(Kf(z))f(z)—[Wz+r]=0,
subject to the second—order condition that marginal revenue declines with Q.
Differentiating logarithmically and solving for d(log K), the effects of
changes in W and z on K are
(13) d(log K) =— esd(logW) —(a+(s—a)e)(logz).
s=Wz/(Wz÷r), labor's share of total cost, can no longer be assumed to equal a.
The next step is to derive the iso—profit and iso—utility functions for





(15) (d(log W) s—a
d(log z)17r s
The second result is obtained by substituting (Wz+r)/f for V' and multiplying
both the numerator and the denominator by z/(Wz+r), and it gives the
proportion by which the firm would require W to change in order to increase z
by a certain proportion. Given the utility function of the form of (4), the
union must formulate its position with respect to W and z with consideration
to how the firm will vary K in response to variations in z and W. The slope




——1—a — (s—a)e -
w
W_Wa
which makes use of (13). It should be pointed out that
the smaller of 13(W/(W_Wa))/e and a+(l-a)/e in order for
indifference curve in W-z space to be downward-sloping.
condition for both parties to be willing to move off the
increasing z is that the slope of (d(log W)/d(log z)) <
requiresthat j3(1+) >tae.
An efficient contract over W and z will be such that the tradeoffs
between the two variables for the firm and the union are equated, as with
point A in Figure 1. Setting (15) equal to (16) and solving for s, the
resultant labor's share of total cost is seen to be
These are precisely the same values that obtain in the "fully Pareto-optimal"
bargaining under the CC regime (see (10) and (11)).
The interesting question is the difference in the models concerning the
relation between employment and the negotiated wage. This is most clearly
seen by examining the special case of rent maximization (31). The elasticity










0 at s=a. This
—af3(l+,t) (17)s—
andthe negotiated labor/capital ratio is




CC model is zero in this case. In the LC model, z equals its nonunion value
and is independent of W, so, since N=zK, the absolute elasticity of N with
respect to W equals —a(log K)/(alog W), which, by (13), is se. For small
values of u, s is approximately equal to a, so the elasticity of N with
respect to W in the LC model equals its value in the DC model less the
capital-labor substitution component, (1-a)c. As u gets large, s-a=a(1—a)/
(l+at)>O, and the absolute wage elasticity of employment in the LC model
rises. However, it is less than r if 4u<o/a(e—a), which is likely over the
plausible range of the parameters. The observed relation between N and W for







Figure 2. The curve for LC model is the closer to that for the CC model the
larger is the proportion of rj accounted for by capital-labor substitution.
For a low value of the elasticity of substitution and/or small fraction of






general result concerning the relation between employment and the
wage is




For (maximizationof the net wage rate), this reduces to ?, and the LC
model (as well as the CC model) degenerates to the DC model. In the
neighborhood of i=O, the absolute slope of the N—W relation for the LC model




relation has a positive slope at ,O if 13<(l—a)a/i (compared to 13<1 in the CC
model).
An interesting variant of the LC model is based on the assumption that
unions and management bargain over workers per unit of output rather thanper
machine. The collective bargain sets q=N/Q and W efficiently, and the firm
sets Q and K so as to maximize profit. The results of this model are
identical to those of the LC model, the demonstration of which is left to the
interested reader.
4. Efficient Featherbedding
An important implication of boththeCC and LC models is that, given
that bothpartieshave the requisite information concerning technological
possibilities, they will agree on a capital/labor ratio that makes full use of
all workers hired.Thereis no "featherbedding" in the sense that a fraction
of the work force of the firm will have literally nothing to do. Instead, an
"efficient" contract will be "inefficient" in the sense that management would
prefer to use a more capital-intensive technology but, given the bargaining
process, they do the best they can with the negotiated z.In, for example,
the case of rent maximization (13=1), the advent of a union with a negotiated
wage above the initial W would mean that the firm would want to increase the a
capital intensity of its production process. Under the LC model,however,the
firm and the union agree to retain the original technology,' so the firm can
only minimize the damage of the imposed wage increase by reducing K, N, and Q
by the same proportion (roughly a times the wage increase). Under the CC
model, the firm and the union agree that the employment level will stay at its
original level, so the firm maximizes profit by renting the same K and selling
the same Q at the same price (so all union gains come at the expense of profit
rather than consumers).14
The conclusion of the LC model concerning the absence of featherbedding
depends crucially on the assumption that there exists an infinite number (or,
at least, several) technologies available to the firm. Suppose, however, that
there is only one technology in the relevant range. Output is a linear
function of the number of machines in use (K) subject to the constraint that
each machine be operated by no fewer than X workers. There is no increase in
output associated with setting z above X, so the iso—profit curves (in terms
of logarithms) have a slope of —1 for z>X (set a=O in (15)). This means that
in order for the firm to agree to "overmanning" (z>X), the union must be
willing to reduce wages by one percentage point for each percentage point
increase in the labor/capital ratio. The rate at which the union is willing
to sacrifice wages for employment is seen by (16) to be (d(log W)/d(log z)) =
—(1—se)/(3((l+)/.i)—se).In order for the union and the firm to agree to a
featherbedding arrangement, it must be true that at z=X (i) the union's
indifference curve is downward-sloping (which requires that SE be less than
one) and (ii) -(d(log W)/d(log z))>1. The second of these conditions
requires that <t/(1+), which means that the union must place a much greater
weight on employment than wages in its utility function for featherbedding to
be mutually advantageous.
The geometry of the featherbedding story is shown in Figure 3. Assume
that the initial equilibrium is at point A, with W=W' and z=X. If the union's
indifference curve were like R' (as would be the case with, for example, rent
maximization), there would be no incentive for the firm and the union to
bargain over z, and featherbedding would not occur. If, however,were
sufficiently small that the union's indifference curve were very steep at z=X,
as is true for R", there will be featherbedding. Both the firm and the union
are indifferent between points A and B, and the firm would have higher profits15
with the same level of utility for the union at point C. Obviously a mutuaLly
agreeable bargain over z and W can be struck that yields a higher level of







Itis worth stressing that the conditions under which both sides will
agree to the existence of featherbedding are rather stringent. First, there
cannot be a more labor intensive technology available in the relevant range,
for it will always pay both parties to move to it rather than force the firm
to hire useless labor. Second, the workers represented by the union cannot be




union's indifference curve may be upward sloping). Third, the range of
bargaining outcomes must be such that the workers are receiving very large
rents (high values of ). Fourth, the union will only push for featherbedding
when employment is valued much more than wages (a value of 3 much less than
one). This would be most likely for a union representing workers for whom
demand has fallen, say due to an exogenous technical innovation. Two examples
of unions that meet these criteria are those representing railroad firemen and
newspaper typographers. Industrial unions, which represent all production
workers in a firm would, by this model, be less likely to bargain for
blatantly unproductive work rules.
5. Bargaining Over Plonk Intensity
A second way in which unions and management can bargain indirectly over
employment is by jointly determining the pace or intensity of work. This may
involve the speed of the assembly line, the number of tasks each worker can be
told to perform, the number and length of coffee breaks, and a myriad of other
nitty—gritty issues.1° One way to represent this is to assume that the firm's
output is a linear homogeneous function of capital and efficiency units of
labor services,
(20) Q =kf(),
where f has the usual properties and b is an index of the intensity of work
that is either mandated by management or negotiated in collective bargaining.
An increase in b, of course, plays a role in the firm's productive function
that is similar to labor augmenting technical change in models of economic
growth.17
Before investigating how b might be treated in the context of union—
management bargaining, it is first necessary to specify how work intensity
would be determined in the absence of unionism. An increase in work intensity
—-atleast beyond a certain low level below which workers are bored
—-presumablylowers the overall attractivness of a job and requires a
compensating differential. Let the utility level associated with a particular
job be a function of the wage rate and work intensity, say U=U(W,b),tJw>O, and
Ub<O•" For the set of jobs requiring a given set of human capital
characteristics, the market utility level is a so a firm's choice of W and b
is constrained by the fact that U(W,b) must equal a This means that an
increase in the firm's work intensity requires that the wage must rise by dW/
db=Ub/Uw. In proportionate terms, 8(log W)/a(log b)=y, where yisthe ratio
of the absolute elasticity of utility with respect to work intensity to the
elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. 7 should increase with b,
reflecting the rising marginal disutility of bad working conditions relative
to the marginal utility of consumption.
The profit equation is now (1) with the modification embodied in (20).
Its total derivative with respect to employment, the wage, and work intensity
is
(21) dir =(V'bf'—W)Nd(logN) -WNd(logW) +V'bf'Nd(logb).
For a nonunion firm, the coefficient on d(log N) is zero, so the firm chooses
b such that y=l. This is illustrated in Figure 4. Given that the market
utility level is U0, the firm maximizes profit by setting work intensity at b'
and the wage at W'.
An increase in the market utility level, reflecting higher average real




level of work effort in the nonunion sector to increase or decrease depending
on whether the positive substitution effect is greater or less than the
absolute value of the (presumably negative) income effect.12 For purposes of
contrasting the determination of b in collective bargaining with that in
nonunion situations, however, it is useful to assume that the equilibrium
value of b is independent of the wage level. (Otherwise, the role of
bargaining in determining b becomes confounded with the effects of the union
on utility per worker.) The most straightforward way to do this is to specify
that (a) the utility is additively separable in W and b and (b) the elasticity
of utility with respect to W is constant. With the (unnecessary but
UI
TI19
expositionally convenient) additional assumption that the marginal utility of
income is constant, the utility function becomes U=W(b), where =-'b/Ø and
di/db>O.
How will work intensity compare with its nonunion value if it is
subject to bargaining between the union and the firm? First, it is clear that
there must be an explicit bargain over (or a very clear implicit understanding
about) the value of b if the union is to be able to improve the welfare of its
members. Suppose this were not so and the determination of work intensity
(like the values of N and K) is considered a "management prerogative." Then,
if the initial bargain solely over wages yields an increase from W' to W" (see
figure 4), the firm will increase intensity from b' to b", thus leaving the
utility of each worker at the nonunion level. The firm, of course, suffers a
slight decrease in profit due to the wage increase, but, by making its
employees work harder, the firm minimizes the damage caused by the union.
To analyze bargaining over work intensity, the union's preferences must
be modified to reflect the disutility associated with work intensity. The
analogue of (4) is
(22) R =(W(b)—U)t3N,
where Ua is the alternative (nonunion) utility level available to union
members. t3is, as in Section 2, an index of the relative importance to the
union of individual utility versus employment. The logarithmic total
derivative of (22) is
(23) d(log R) =d(logN) + d(log W) -W -U7d(log b).20
The nature of an efficient bargain between the firm and the union depends on
which variables are "on the table." First consider the case in which there is
bargaining over N, W, and b, the equivalent of the CC model investigated in
Section 2. The proportionate tradeoffs of N and b for W from the iso-profit
and iso—utility curves are seen by (21) and (23) to be










Bysetting the rates of substitution of employment for wages equal for both






where (b)=U/W. Notice that if the bargained level of work intensity
remains at its nonunion level, ct'(b)=(b), and (24) reduces to (7). In
general, however, it will not be true that b=b. Let LL=(U_Ua)/Ua be the
proportionate impact of the bargaining outcome on individual utility. This
implies that the ratio of the marginal revenue product to the negotiated wage
in contract equilibrium is
V'bf'— 1z
(25)
which is less than one unless the union cares nothing about employment ($3=D)
or if the union has no success in bargaining (=0). Equating the two rates of21
substitution of work intensity for wages, the value of b in contract
equilibrium is set such that 'y is less than one. Sinceincreases with b,
the negotiated level of work effort is less than ba
The reason for this result is that as part of the efficient bargain the
firm must agree to hire more workers than it would choose if it were free to
maximize profit. The loss in profit due to decreasing b is related to the
value of the marginal product of labor, but, since this must be artificially
low, it is relatively less costly for the firm to make concessions with
respect to work intensity than would be true if N were at the discretion of
management. Referring to Figure 4, the value of d(log W)/d(log b) is less
than one for t>O, so the iso—profit curve is tangent to the iso—utility curve
R" at a value of work intensity less than b".
Now assume that the firm and the union bargain only over W and b, the
equivalent o the DC model in Section 2. The union must now take account of
the effect of variations in both W and b on employment. It is straightforward
to show that
(26) d(log N) =—d(logW) +(i—1)d(logb),
where =ae+(l—a)c. An increase in work intensity raises or lowers N as
The firm is free to maximize ir with respect to N, so V'bf'=W and (d(log W)/







1+J2 —77 + 1
1+11
7 7?
Assuming12>0 and 13<o', the value of this at 7=1 is greater than one, implying
that both the union and the management can increase their welfare by an
appropriate reduction in both W and b. The solution value of 7 in this case
is 1— ---,whichis exactly what it is in the situation in which there is
bargaining over N as well as W and b. (This is analogous to the result in
Section 2 that the solution for the labor/capital ratio is identical in the CC
and LC models.) Not surprisingly, for the case in which there is efficient
bargaining over W, b, and z, the solution value of b follows the same rule.13
The results for models in which there is efficient bargaining with
respect to work intensity suggest that, to the extent that unions derive
utility from employment as well as wage rents (i.e., 3<o), unions and
management will always agree to lower work intensity levels below those that
would maximize individual utility. Three points are worth stressing.
First, the conclusions of this section are based on the implicit
assumption that the monitoring of an agreement concerning work intensity is
easy and costless. It is in fact not difficult to see how the day—to--day
fulfillment of agreements on number of functions performed per worker, washup
time, and the like could lead to differences in interpretation and conflict.
The management has, as in the CC model, an incentive to cheat on any agreement
about b, for it can still retain its workers because they are receiving wages
in excess of opportunity cost. To the extent that firms can cheat, one would
expect to observe b close to or greater than b, whereas a carefully monitored
agreement on intensity would make b less than b.'423
Second, unlike the model of bargaining over the labor/capital ratio,
the LC model, bargaining over work intensity is not a device for moving toward
the outcome associated with fully efficient bargaining over employment as well
as wages. For the case in which there is bargaining over W and b, for
example, the absolute proportional effect of a wage increase on employment
will be greater or less thanas the labor demand elasticity is 1.
Third, an important assumption underlying the results concerning work
intensity in this section is that workers receive some utility from a lower b
holding the wage constant. Consider, however, a dimension of work intensity
(such as the width of a paintbrush) that does not require greater effort on
the part of workers. Union insistence on a lower value of b in such a case is
a form of featherbedding, a contractual obligation by the firm to pay for
unnecessary labor. This is represented in the present model by assuming that
.b can take any value up to some maximum (or "normal') level and that7 is zero
in the relevant range. An efficient bargain restricting b below its maximum
level can be struck only if the union is willing to accept a decrease in wages
proportionately greater than the reduction in b. This requires that (27) with
7=0 exceed one, which means that j3>i/(l+). This is the condition for
featherbedding to be mutually agreeable in the case of bargaining over the
labor/capital ratio with o=0; indeed, it is the same model.
Finally, to this point it has been assumed that each worker is employed
for a fixed number of hours per unit of time. There is no reason, however,
why the union cannot bargain over hours per worker per period (h) as well as
wages and on other variables like z and b. Assume that individual utility is
an increasing function of both consumption and leisure, say U=iti(wh,-h). Given
freedom to choose hours, h will satisfy Wp1—=0. Without fixed costs per
employee, the profit equation is ir=V(Kf(hN/K))-whN--rK, and the firm is24
indifferent between any combination of N and h such that their product equal
the profit—maximizing level.'5 The union's utility function is now
and, since the firm does not care what h is, the union can set hours
unilaterally. As with the work intensity model, the solution for the labor
supply model is identical when there is bargaining over W and h and N, z, or
nothing else. This solution is
11/2
(28)—=wl—
where 4isthe elasticity of utility with respect to consumption and ,.i=('-U)/
U. This implies that, given the utility level of individual union members,
hours of work will always be less than each union member would choose freely
at the negotiated wage rate so long as u>O and t3<c'.This result, of course,
is analogous to that for the intensity model.
6. Profit—Sharing
The results to this point indicate that negotiations over the labor!
capital ratio and/or work intensity do not yield outcomes that are fully
consistent with the CC model. After the bargain over wages and the other
variable(s), the incentive of the firm is to maximize profit, and, in the
absence of a direct agreement concerning the level of employment, the firm's
decisions will not maximize union utility. This suggests that it may be in
the interest of the union to insist on profit—sharing with the firm so that
both sides benefit mutually from post-bargaining decisions.
Assume that (as in increasing number of unionized industries in the
U.S.) there is profit—sharing. The firm retains (l—t) of total profit, given25
by (1), and each worker receives W+y, where y is his share of profits, tir/N.
The union and the firm first negotiate the value of the wage and t, the share
of total profit to be distributed to workers, and then the management is free
to set employment and capital so as to maximize net profit subject to the
negotiated values if W and t (work intensity is assumed to remain constant).
Since the firm's objective is the maximization of C=(l—t),r, employment is not
affected by t and the absolute elasticity of employment with respect to the
negotiated wage is r as in the DC model. Since a7r/aW=—N, the slope of the
iso-profit curve is
29(a(log W) —— iT/N 'at'c (1—t)W
The objective of the union is maximization of (4) with W+y replacing W, and
the slope of its iso—utility curve is
a(log W)—— - f3ir/N
$(1—t)W+(3—l)
An efficient bargain over W and t yields an outcome such that (29) and (30)
are equal. This implies that
(31) (—1)t —(W—W)=0.
Let W+y=(l+LL)W, where jisnow the union relative wage effect including the
profit sharing payment. The solution wage rate conditional on the union's
success in bargaining is
w
(32)W =—[—(1—j3)].26
This implies that for M>O the negotiated wage will bethe alternative wage
as Since the labor/capital ratio and employment are determined on the
basis of the negotiated wage, employment under profit sharing will be
identical to that in the CC model (see (11)).
The interesting question raised by this model is why profit sharing in
unionized monopolistic industries is not more common (see Remus for evidence
on its frequency in different countries). First, the firm may not want to
open its books to union representatives who would tend to question certain
expenditures (e.g., the level of management salaries). Second, the incentives
for the firm to cheat (i.e., engage in "creative accountancy") are enormous,
and this would, as in the original CC model, instill reluctance in union
members to give up tangible wage rents for something requiring faith in
management's integrity.1' Third, to the extent that, as in many monopolistic
industries, profits vary greatly over the, business cycle, risk averse workers
may prefer a certain W to an uncertain y. Finally, as with the CC model, the
median union member may not care much about the employment of others, in which
caseis large and a given rent will be realized mainly from W rather than
y.17
7. Summary and Overview
This paper has investigated, from the viewpoint of conventional static
economic theory, some of the implications of situations in which unions and
management bargain over working conditions as well as wages. The primary
motivation for considering this topic was the dispute in the literature
concerning whether or not the relation between wages and employment in
unionized firms reflects Pareto—efficient bargaining, but questions such as27
why restrictions on effort and featherbedding exist are interesting in
themselves.
There are four main conclusions:
First, if unions and management bargain indirectly over employment by
negotiating the value or the labor/capital ratio or person-hours per unit of
output, the resultant level of employment is between the outcomes of a fully
efficient bargain (informed bargaining over employment and wages) and a
conventional bargain solely over wages. The wage elasticity of employment in
this situation is approximately equal to the Hicks formula at a zero
elasticity of substitution. Labor is fully utilized at the technology that
would prevail if there were no union wage premium.
Second, featherbedding (the hiring of totally unproductive labor) will
be an outcome of collective bargaining only if there does not exist a
technology appropriate to nonunion wages and if the union values employment
much more highly than wage rents. It is difficult to see how a featherbedding
agreement could exist for a long period of time (except in Britain, where
nothing ever changes), for it is not in the interests of younger union members
to replace older ones as they die off.
Third, efficient bargaining over work intensity yields the result that
the contract will specify a slower pace of work than would be chosen by an
individual bargain between each worker and the firm. At the same time, the
existence of a wage premium for union workers provides the firm with a great
incentive to cheat by trying to make its employees work harder. Since,
ceteris paribus, value added in the firm depends positively on actual work
intensity, the result that unions sometimes increase and sometimes decrease
productivity (see Freeman and Medoff) is not surprising.28
Fourth, a system of profit sharing in which there is efficient
bargaining over bothwagerates and the share of profit allocated to workers
will yield the fully Pareto efficient outcome with respect to employment.
This result, however, is mostly of theoretical interest, for, whatever the
reasons, profit sharing agreements are still fairly uncommon.
It should be stressed that all of the interesting departures from the
conventional demand curve equilibrium model results depend crucially on the
union placing a value on employment relative to individual wage rents. If the
union cares only about rents except in crisis situations (a hypothesis
advanced long ago by Cartter), bargaining will generally be uni-dimensional
and the efficient bargaining controversy moot.29
Footnotes
1For a perceptive summary of this literature see Farber (1984).
2A rigorous exposition of the conventional approach is provided by
Oswald (1982).
3For a lucid discussion of various union practices affecting
employment indirectly, see Chapter 7 of Rees. Allen provides a lengthy
discussion of restrictive work practices in the construction industry. In
1976 21 percent of union workers were covered by contractual provisions
specifying "crew size" (9 percent in manufacturing and 33 percent in
nonrnanufacturing). These Bureau of Labor Statistics data refer to large
contracts (￿ 1000 workers) but do not include the railroad and airline
industries, in which this practice is very common. A particularly lucid
taxonomy of various restrictive work practices in Britain (where, following
theclassic film, "I'm All Right, Jack," they are a fine art) is found in the
Royal Commission on Trade Unions.
4See, in particular, Ashenfelter and Brown, MaCurdy and Pencavel,
Farber (1984), Pencavel, Oswald (1984), and Abowd.
51f the product demand function has a constant—price elasticity (>
1), Eisthat elasticity.
'Monitoring problems would arise when radically different technology
becomes available. Then the union has less than full information about
technological parameters and is likely to be (justifiably) suspicious of any
explanations put forward by management.
7Two early papers, by Simler and Hartman, investigated some aspects of
the LC model geometrically. See also the paper by Weinstein.
8For a historical discussion of this practice in the British shoe
industry in the early 1900s see Fox.
'For l<3<o,thecapital intensity of the production process is
increased but not by as much as the firm's engineers would like; for 3<l the
negotiated z would increase,
'°For descriptions of many such practices in a wide range of industries
in the U.S. --anda claim that they have become less prevalent during the
recessionary l980s, see "A Work Revolution in U.S. Industry," Business Week,
May 16, 1983.
''Recall that it has been assumed that hours of work are assumed to be
fixed. Otherwise, hours of labor supply would be an argument in the utility
function.
'2The problem is very similar to that of determining the sign of the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply.
'31n the case of the general individual utility function, the solution





where 5 is the elasticity of U with respect to W. This implies that, if >0
and b is always less than the level that would be chosen in individual
bargains given that utility level.
14The evidence on whether work intensity is in fact higher or lower in
the union than in the nonunion sector is rather thin. The results of Duncan
and Stafford appear to indicate that certain dimensions of b are higher for
union workers. To answer the appropriate question for present purposes
satisfactorily, however, one must control much more thoroughly than could
Duncan and Stafford for type of job to remove the possibility that the union
dummy variable is simply correlated with onerous jobs.
15The formulation is more interesting and realistic when fixed costs per
worker, say cN, are included. Then the firm is willing to pay the worker to
increase hours beyond the utility—maximizing level implied by satisfaction of
the individuals marginal condition. The results with this complication,
however, are not qualitatively different from the simpler model.
''Hoerr reports a large increase in the use of profit sharing in the
U.S. —-mostnotably intheauto industry ——duringthe early 1980s. This
may, however, be attributable to a desire of the relevant companies and union
leadership to reduce /2,anaction necessary because of increased international
competition, without incurring the. wrath of militant union members.
'Weitzman haas argued persuasively that a comprehensive profit—sharing
system similar to the above would have superior macroeconomic properties to
those of the equivalent of the DC model. The main drawback to its adoption,
in his view, is the fact that most of its benefits are external to the
incumbent workers in the firm. To use Weitzmants example, if the typical UAW
worker at GM does not feel threatened by job loss (and derives no utility from
the welfare of other workers), i.e. 3 is large, that union will not push for
public policies to bring about voluntary profit-sharing.References
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